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Abstract—The increasing pervasiveness of Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs) in diverse application domains including critical
infrastructure systems, sets an extremely high security bar in the
design of WSN systems to exploit their full benefits, increasing
trust while avoiding loss. Nevertheless, a combination of resource
restrictions and the physical exposure of sensor devices inevitably
cause such networks to be vulnerable to security threats, both
external and internal. While several researchers have provided
a set of open problems and challenges in WSN security and
privacy, there is a gap in the systematic study of the security
implications arising from the nature of existing communication
protocols in WSNs. Therefore, we have carried out a deep-dive
into the main security mechanisms and their effects on the most
popular protocols and standards used in WSN deployments i.e.
IEEE 802.15.4, B-MAC, 6LoWPAN, RPL, BCP, CTP, and CoAP,
where potential security threats and existing countermeasures
are discussed at each layer of WSN stack. This work culminates
in a deeper analysis of network layer attacks deployed against
the RPL routing protocol. We quantify the impact of individual
attacks on the performance of a network using the Cooja network
simulator. Finally, we discuss new research opportunities in
network layer security and how to use Cooja as a benchmark
for developing new defenses for WSN systems.
Index Terms—CPS, WSN, security, communication protocols,
RPL, network layer attacks, Cooja.
I. INTRODUCTION
TODAY, millions of embedded devices are used in diverseapplications to enhance the way we work and live, by
saving time and resources and opening new opportunities for
growth and innovation [1]. The leading application domains
include military and crime prevention, environment, industry
and agriculture, and urbanization and infrastructure [2]. The
synergy of cyber and physical worlds contribute to Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPSs) which are expected to be applied
to the crucial areas of national importance (e.g. health care,
intelligent transportation, critical infrastructure monitoring and
control) therefore they must operate dependably, safely, se-
curely, efficiently and in real-time [3]. The existence of such a
large network of interconnected entities poses major security
and privacy issues that prevent its wide adoption. As these
systems carry sensitive data, security issues should be central
to their design; a well-defined security infrastructure that
can mitigate the security challenges related to privacy, data
integrity, and availability is an absolute requirement [4], [5].
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are considered as one
of the core technologies in implementing CPSs. These are
systems of low-cost, low-power, resource constrained devices
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with sensors and radio transceivers used for communication.
WSN’s intelligence and power lie in the sum of their parts,
their network and interaction, yet communication is their
greatest weakness, and many attacks exist to disrupt WSN ser-
vices. Moreover, they are often deployed in publicly accessible
environments. Once combined, the resource restrictions and
the physical exposure of sensor devices makes conventional
IT security methods inadequate. These fail to consider the
numerous interactions among different components, the het-
erogeneity of the networks, the cyber-to-physical connections
and the network’s volatile and dynamical nature [6]. Also, they
demand computational resources typically unavailable to such
devices. New lightweight security mechanisms are needed and
their complexity will vary depending on device specification,
network technology, and type of application/service provided
[7].
There have been several conducted studies and surveys
(e.g. [8]–[13]) that have addressed the security aspects of
IoT (Internet of Things) and WSNs. For instance, in [8]–
[12] the main research challenges and the existing solutions
in the field of IoT security are surveyed. The main thread of
existing surveys is that they generally focus on identifying
the security challenges and threats in IoT and WSNs, as
well as give recommendations on how to build new security
mechanisms. While we too present a taxonomy of attacks
and their consequences on network performance to ensure a
comprehensive, up-to-date list and also set up the stage for the
further analysis, our survey takes a different direction.
The current paper focuses on looking in depth into exist-
ing communication protocols and standards to identify their
security gaps. Compared to [13], rather than providing the
research challenges and open research issues, we analyze the
countermeasures available in the literature to ensure the pro-
tection of selected communication protocols from malicious
activity. Our discussion is guided by the WSN protocol stack,
but we also provide a categorization with respect to the attack
they were built for, and we classify them into three groups:
preventive solutions, intrusion detection schemes and reactive
solutions. This way we measure their resilience towards attack
scenarios. The identification of strong and weak features of
the countermeasures leads to building more secure protocols
for WSNs. Also, we quantify the impact of several network
layer attacks on the network’s performance using the Cooja
simulation tool to show the potential of using Cooja as a
benchmark for the development of new security mechanisms.
Finally, we briefly highlight that providing a response system
that is not only able to detect attackers, but also enables the
network to recover from the intrusion and prevent any further
disruptions of service is one of the potential research directions
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in the design of more secure WSN systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
discusses security requirements, vulnerabilities and mecha-
nisms in WSNs. In Sec. III communication protocols used
in WSN deployments are briefly described. In Sec. IV-VI we
provide a systematic analysis of attacks and mechanisms for
addressing them for each of the protocols presented in Sec. III.
In Sec. VII we analyze the effects of network layer attacks on
the RPL-based network using the Cooja network simulator. We
discuss the opportunity of using the Cooja as a benchmark for
developing new defenses. Finally, in Sec. VIII we conclude
the article.
II. SECURITY FEATURES OF WSNS
A WSN is an infrastructure-less network composed of
hundreds of sensor nodes. These cooperatively sense and
control the environment to enable its interaction with people
or devices [14]. Data is captured at the level of the sensor
node, compressed and transmitted to the gateway. Through the
gateway connection, data is then passed by the base station to
a server. WSNs typically employ layered architecture which
typically consists of five layers. These are depicted in Fig. 1
with the problems addressed by each layer. There are several
features which make WSNs different from wired networks and
more vulnerable to security attacks. These are:
• Self-organization - Sensor networks have no fixed struc-
ture and positions of sensor nodes are random. Any
failures in the network should be neutralized through the
self-organizing mechanism to enable nodes to discover
their neighbors and reestablish the communication [15].
• Self-adaptive flow control - Based on the quality of the
link and the number of transmission errors, the transmis-
sion flow is adjusted to solve the network performance
degradation in unstable transmission conditions [16].
• Resource restrictions - Limited processing abilities, stor-
age capacity and communication bandwidth allow the use
of a lightweight security mechanisms only, which can
prevent most of external attacks, but provide no protection
from internal attacks [7].
• Centralized control - Sensor nodes are centrally con-
trolled and the data flows between nodes according to
the rules of routing algorithm applied. Different routing
protocols face different security challenges, but there is a
commonality in the fact that most of them were developed
without appropriate consideration of security.
• Open environment - WSNs are deployed in accessible
environments which increases the probability of node
capture by adversaries. Then, various internal attacks may
be initiated by the compromised node and an adversary
may overtake the complete control of network.
Overall, the aforementioned characteristics require the adop-
tion of security mechanisms optimized for use in WSNs such
that they provide a high level of efficiency and reliability.
Next, we present an extensive, up-to-date list of security
requirements and attacks in WSNs with respect to layered
WSN architectures with the objective to exploit these in the
communication protocols analysis in the further sections. We
briefly introduce the notion of security mechanisms in WSNs
also following the layered approach.
A. Security Requirements
Traditionally, confidentiality, integrity and availability were
considered as security services which should be provided by
sensor networks [17].
Confidentiality to ensure the secrecy of the data transmitted
between sensor nodes by limiting the data access to intended
users only. It is mainly based on the use of cryptographic
techniques at physical layer, where data is encrypted at the
sending node to prevent information disclosure to unauthorized
users [17]. Integrity to assure that the data transmitted cannot
be altered during transmission until it reaches its original
destination. The data integrity may be breached by having a
malicious node in the network. This can be solved through
the utilization of the automatic code update and recovery
process [18]. Availability to ensure that the network is able to
provide services at any time for the authorized users. Various
mechanisms are used to save energy and extend the life of
network, but also to prevent denial of service. For example,
the denial of service due to jamming is traditionally prevented
by spread spectrum techniques.
As WSNs are expected to be integrated into the critical
infrastructures where the sensitive data is exchanged and
security needs are higher, the additional security requirements
have to be defined. These can be grouped into three categories:
1) Data level requirements:
• Anonymity - Hiding the source of the data contributes to
the information protection and confidentiality.
• Freshness - To guarantee that data is recent and not
duplicated.
2) Access level requirements:
• Authentication - Verifying that the received message
comes from a true sender.
• Authorization - Ensuring that only authorized users and
devices have the access to the network.
• Accessibility - Ensuring that sensor nodes have the access
to the authorized information only.
3) Network level requirements:
• Robustness/Resiliency - To guarantee that the network
is able to function and serve the purpose if the number
of nodes increases or in the case of some nodes getting
compromised.
3• Self-organization - Having the sensor nodes that are
independent and flexible to self-organize in the case of
any node failure or new nodes joining the network.
• Time synchronization - Can be required for different
purposes, such as the power conservation, computation of
the packet’s end-to-end delay, the group synchronization
for tracking applications, etc.
The complexity of a security framework will vary depending
on the device specification, network technology, and type of
application/service provided. Therefore, addressing the secu-
rity requirements on multiple layers is needed. For example,
if sensitive data is measured or shared by devices, the security
requirements will be centered on data level requirements to
ensure the data protection and confidentiality, but also on the
access level requirements to control access to the resources.
B. Security Vulnerabilities
The wireless nature of communication, the lack of physical
protection and the resource restrictions make WSNs suscep-
tible to many attacks. In general, attacks can be classified as
either external or internal. An external attacker does not have
the control of nodes; it instead injects data or eavesdrops on
information to disturb the normal network operation. Contrar-
ily, an internal attacker is able to capture the sensor nodes
which enables its further malicious activity. The boundary to
divide the attacks as external or internal is not always easy,
as they might have similar behavior. That is why most of
the research on this topic provides vulnerabilities and security
solutions appropriate to the individual layer in the architecture.
Similarly, we give a taxonomy of attacks with respect to
layered WSN architecture. For completeness, we include the
attacks which can be launched against more than one layer
of WSN. While we aim to cover the major attacks for WSN,
less common attacks might be omitted and new security threats
may arise over time due to the very nature of security.
1) The physical layer is the lowest layer in WSN protocol
stack where the physical characteristics of signal transmission
are specified. The broadcast nature of wireless communication
makes it susceptible to jamming, eavesdropping, node tamper-
ing, and hardware hacking.
2) The data link layer enables nodes to access a shared
medium and use it efficiently in order to regulate the data
flow. It also deals with transmission errors. The most common
attacks are related to MAC (Medium Access Control) sublayer
of data link layer and these are: jamming and collisions.
3) The network layer provides data routing paths for net-
work communication. A malicious node within the network
can initiate a broad range of internal attacks, such as spoof-
ing/replaying information, selective forwarding, blackhole,
sinkhole, node replication attack, wormhole, and hello flood.
4) The transport layer is responsible for the reliable trans-
port of data. During the transmission data can get compro-
mised as well as the connection established between nodes
due to a data integrity attack, energy drain attack, and desyn-
chronization attack.
5) The application layer aggregates the data and interacts
with the end user. It is mostly vulnerable to ’malware’ attacks
which can affect nodes or application programs such as attacks
on reliability and the malicious code attack.
6) Multi-layer attacks can be initiated at different layers of
the WSN protocol stack or can be developed as a combination
of two or more of the previously defined attacks. These are
denial of service (DoS) attacks and man in the middle attacks.
In Table I we give a description of all enlisted attacks,
we classify them to internal or/and external and we give the
consequences they have on the network’s performance.
C. Security Mechanisms
WSN architectures use a range of communication protocols
to satisfy the communication needs of diverse applications.
Even though protocols utilize the limited capabilities of sensor
nodes, the majority of them have not been designed with a
security goal in mind. Security solutions can be developed at
any of the layers of WSN stack as different types of applica-
tions may have different requirements. Security at lower layers
(physical and MAC) is based on cryptography algorithms and
key management mechanisms to ensure data protection and
node authentication. Security at the network layer perform
identity authentication and communication security through
data encryption. Transport layer solutions use two-way authen-
tication schemes aiming towards end-to-end security. However,
this is usually maintained at the application layer which has
the advantage of setting the security properties on a per-
message basis. To have a complete security mechanism, the
security of individual layers is absolutely necessary. If one
layer gets compromised, the security of the whole network is
compromised despite the efficient security mechanisms of the
other layers.
A number of researchers have focused their work on de-
signing protocols which support some of the security features.
For completeness of the article, we list few examples. In
[19], authors proposed two secure building blocks, SNEP and
µTESLA, that are optimized for highly resource-constrained
sensor networks and provide data confidentiality, two-party
data authentication and data freshness. An extension of SNEP
is known as TinySec [20] and it provides similar services,
while being more efficient. In [21], authors presented LEAP, a
symmetric cryptography based solution that proved very effec-
tive in defending against some of the network layer attacks. In
[22], a link layer protocol LLSP was presented that achieves
message integrity and authentication, while [23] describes a
SIGF family of configurable secure routing protocols. None of
these security measures does not guarantee a complete security
solution as they were rather built as defense mechanism to a
specific attack or to ensure a particular security requirement.
In this paper, rather than analyzing the features of secure
protocols, we focus on the security mechanisms which were
proposed in the literature for widely deployed and energy-
efficient standards and protocols in WSNs. We categorize the
mechanisms into three groups as:
• Preventive solutions (PS) that harden network protocols
against specific attacks, but fail to address run-time
security, they do not halt nor detect intruders nor ensure
continued network functionality during an attack.
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ATTACKS, THE EXTERNAL/INTERNAL ATTACK CLASSIFICATION AND THE CONSEQUENCES ON THE NETWORK’S PERFORMANCE
Attack Layer Type Features of the attack Consequences on network’s performance
Eavesdropping Physical Ex Overhear and intercept the data in the transmit
coverage area of a node, without its knowledge.
Gaining access to the private and/or sensitive
information.
Basic jammers Physical Ex Intentional radio emission to prevent or disrupt
the transmission of data.
Destroying the signal, causing the congestion
and exhausting the nodes’ energy.
Node tampering Physical Ex/In Physical replacement of the entire node or its
part.
Gaining access and altering sensitive informa-
tion (e.g. routing tables, cryptographic keys).
Hardware hacking Physical Ex/In Physical damage to nodes by the malicious
entities.
Nodes can lose their expected functionality
which makes them vulnerable to other risks.
Intelligent jamming Data link Ex Data packets are targeted directly as the protocol
rules or the data distribution are known.
Destroying the signal, causing the congestion
and exhausting the nodes’ energy.
Collision Data link In Using the occupied radio channels will cause
collisions with neighboring nodes.
Disrupting the transmission of data, increasing
congestion and interference.
Spoofed/altered inf. Network Ex/In Create non-existent information or partially
modify data.
Attracting/repelling network traffic, creating
routing loops.
Replay attack Network In Repeating a valid data transmission. Generating false error messages, disrupting the
routes, increasing congestion and interference.
Selective forwarding Network In Refusing to forward messages from selected
nodes.
Reducing traffic and increasing data loss.
Blackhole Network In Failing to forward any data packets received
including its own data.
Reducing traffic and increasing data loss.
Sinkhole Network In Advertising false information to create a center
of attraction for other nodes.
Compromise of transmission routes, reducing
traffic and increasing data loss.
Sybil attack Network In Presenting multiple identities in the network. Compromise of transmission routes.
Node replication Network Ex/In Physical capturing of a node, its replication and
deployment back into the network.
Compromise of transmission routes, eavesdrop-
ping on the falsely created links.
Wormhole Network In Create a low link tunnel between two malicious
nodes in different parts of network.
Sending data to the false destinations, undermin-
ing cryptography protection.
Hello flood Network Ex/In Broadcasting a hello packet to the whole net-
work with great transmission power.
Increasing energy degradation and collisions,
creating false transmission routes.
Data integrity Transport In Data compromising during the transmission by
changing the content or injecting false messages.
Falsifying routing data can disrupt the networks
normal operation.
Energy drain Transport Ex/In Send as many connection establishment requests
to a targeted node/nodes as possible.
Exhausting node resources, if many nodes are
affected can lead to the denial of service.
Desynchron. attack Transport Ex/In Forge messages between two nodes making the
receiver node to request the retransmission of
data so that synchronization is lost.
Unstable or broken communication links, com-
promise of transmission routes.
Attacks on reliability Application Ex/In Insert the node on the path of communication to
generate false data or queries.
Increasing energy degradation and collisions.
Malicious code attack Application Ex/In Inject a ”worm” that triggers the application to
malfunction or overtakes the complete control of
the application services.
Eliminates network’s capacity to perform its
expected function.
Denial of Service Multi-Layer Ex/In A general attack that could include several other
attacks happening simultaneously.
Eliminates network’s capacity to perform its
expected function.
Man in the middle Multi-Layer Ex/In Sniff the network to intercept the communi-
cation between two sensor nodes during the
exchange keys stage, without their knowledge.
Gaining access to the private and/or sensitive
information.
• Intrusion Detection Schemes (IDS) can identify attacks at
run-time, but cannot provide a response to the intrusion
which would prevent any further disruptions of service.
• Reactive solutions (RS) feature in the IDS, but also the
response system which enables the network to recover
from the intrusion and prevent any further disruptions of
service.
A brief protocol description is given next which is followed
by an analysis of their security mechanisms in the subsequent
sections.
III. WSN STANDARDS & PROTOCOLS
To understand the security requirements of selected proto-
cols and standards, our discussion is guided by the protocol
stack in Fig. 2. Compared to the architecture in Fig. 1, it has an
additional adaptation layer to enable low-power sensor nodes
to connect to the Internet. First, we consider the standards
under the IETF standardization work. These can be layered
one on top of another and are given in red. Additionally, a
lightweight and energy-efficient MAC layer protocol, B-MAC
is presented. It is one of the few specialized MAC protocols
whose implementation was tested in hardware and it was used
as a basis for the development of many other low-power MAC
protocols. Also, we consider two collection routing protocols,
BCP and CTP, which are used to gather data from multiple
sources to a single or multiple sinks. BCP makes routing
and forwarding decisions on a per-packet basis without routes
establishment, while CTP is the tree-based protocol closely
related to RPL. A brief description is given next which will
be extended to their security analysis in subsequent sections.
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A. IEEE 802.15.4 for PHY and MAC Layer Communication
IEEE 802.15.4 [24] is a radio technology standard that
defines both, PHY and MAC layers for low-power and low-
data-rate communications. Due to its low power consumption,
low cost, and flexibility, it has been used in many industrial
applications [25], but also in other fields, such as health
monitoring [26], smart home energy management system [27].
The original IEEE 802.15.4 standard from 2006 was amended
throughout the years to IEEE 802.15.4.e version that is of
particular interest for our discussion as it supports time-
synchronized channel hopping communication. We discuss
three versions of IEEE 802.15.4 standard, which are:
1) IEEE 802.15.4 PHY: The standard supports 11 channels
in low-frequency band (868/915 MHz) and 16 channels in the
high-frequency ISM (Industrial, Scientific and Medical) radio
band (2.4 GHz). In order to achieve less interference along
the frequency bands with an improved signal to noise ratio
the standard employs different modulation techniques [13].
2) IEEE 802.15.4 MAC: The standard manages the access
to physical channels and time slots, frame detection and node
association and it uses CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Avoidance) method. It has two channel
access modes and it defines different types of devices, which
provides possibility of having different network topologies
(star, peer-to-peer, cluster) [28].
3) IEEE 802.15.4.e MAC: The revised version of
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC supports multi-hop communications by
employing Time Synchronized Mesh Protocol (TSMP). De-
vices are synchronized to a schedule which indicates to which
neighbor to communicate and on which channel.
Fig. 3 depicts the IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure. The PHY
frame contains a synchronization header which consists of a
preamble, the Start of Frame Delimiter (SFD) to indicate the
start of an arriving packet, and the PHY Header (PHR) to
indicate the length of the payload. These are followed by the
payload of fixed size of 127 bytes. The MAC frame includes
the header (control field, sequence number and address),
payload of the variable size and Frame Check Sequence (FCS)
used to verify the integrity of the frame. The whole MAC
frame size has to be less than 127 bytes to satisfy the size
constraint of the physical layer.
B. B-MAC (Berkeley Media Access Control for Low-Power
Sensor Networks)
B-MAC [29] belongs to the category of energy-efficient
protocols where the energy spent on idle listening is reduced
by using some form of a sleep/listen schedule. The protocol
Fig. 3. Typicall IEEE 802.15.4 frame on a 2.4 GHz network
uses random access to the communication medium, which
means that there are no slots or frames to send the data, but
these can be added if there is a need [30]. As the sending
and receiving nodes are not synchronized, the transmitter has
to transmit a preamble that is long enough to be detected by
the receiver which only wakes up periodically (LPL - low-
power listening). When a node overhears the preamble, it
remains awake to receive the data packet that follows. The
behavior of B-MAC sender and receiver is depicted in Fig. 4.
The check interval between two channel sensing is defined
based on the average node degree and traffic levels [29]. The
duration of preamble might be changed depending on the
application requirements. In [29], authors showed that B-MAC
could achieve duty cycles as low as 1% in a low-traffic network
if ideal conditions were assumed. The main disadvantage of
the protocol is a large overhead caused by the preamble.
C. 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area
Networks)
6LoWPAN is a network protocol responsible for universal
Internet connectivity that enables low-power wireless nodes
to connect to the Internet. It can be considered as a key
technology that changed a previous perception of IPv6 as
being impractical for a use in constrained low-energy wireless
communication environments [13]. 6LoWPAN defines the
communication on often-called adaptation layer for transmit-
ting IPv6 over IEEE 802.15.4 networks [31]. The adaptation
layer fragments the IPv6 packets into smaller pieces, as
minimum size of IPv6 packet is 1280 bytes and IEEE 802.15.4
supports 127 bytes long packets. Also, it provides the header
compression to optimize the usage of the limited payload space
and to ensure that it can be supported by the lower layers [32].
All 6LoWPAN packets transported over the IEEE 802.15.4
MAC layer include a stack of 6LoWPAN headers which use is
optional [13]. The protocol supports multihop communication
where the nodes can forward packets on each other’s behalf.
The biggest challenge for 6LoWPAN protocol was to provide a
routing solution that supports different communication patterns
and deals with limited resources, low-data rates, link failures,
and nodes mobility which lead to a new routing protocol, RPL.
D. RPL (Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy Net-
works)
RPL [33] is a distance-vector routing protocol which sup-
ports a variety of link layer technologies (IEEE 802.15.4,
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Wireless HART, ISA100 etc.), sharing the common charac-
teristics of being low bandwidth, lossy and low power. As
such, RPL is widely used in WSNs [31]. It defines two types
of components: WSN nodes, acting as hosts or intermediate
routers, and local border routers (LBRs) responsible for packet
translation from the Internet to hosts [32]. By exchanging
the node/link metrics, RPL builds a Destination Oriented
Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) where usually LBRs are
roots. The topology is rank metric depended, where the rank
metric encodes the distance of each node from a reference
root which has rank 1. The best path is computed based
on an objective function which, by default, uses a number
of hops as the routing metric. Additional metrics could be
specified, such as the node energy consumption or the expected
number of transmissions (ETX). RPL protocol can support
MP2P (Multipoint-to-Point), P2MP (Point-to-Multipoint) and
P2P (Point-to-Point) topologies. The topology maintenance
and information exchange is supported by four types of
control messages: DIO (DODAG Information Object), DAO
(Destination Advertisement Object), DIS (DODAG Informa-
tion Solicitation) and DAO-ACK. RPL has a mechanism for
loop prevention and detection. Also, it provides a self-healing
through a local or a global repair mechanism in the events
of link/node failure or divergence from the optimal network
shape.
E. BCP (Backpressure Collection Protocol)
BCP [34] is a low-overhead protocol which was evaluated
in real experiments. It is based on the concept of dynamic
backpressure routing where there is no explicit path compu-
tation between source and destination (i.e. ’routing without
routes’). The routing and forwarding paths are chosen based
on the link backpressure weight which is a function of the
queue and link state information. If the forwarding queue is
non-empty, node computes weights for all of its neighbors.
If no neighbor with positive weight can be identified, the
node waits for a back-off period to recompute the weights.
Upon detecting one or more neighbor with positive weights,
the node forwards packet to the neighbor with the greatest
positive weight. Routing decisions are made separately on a
per packet basis [35]. One of the key features of BCP is the
last-in-first-out (LIFO) queuing discipline of packets in each
node, which decreases the end-to-end packet delay. The LIFO
queue is implemented through the notion of virtual queue,
which stores no real data and requires only an integer size [34].
Fig. 5. CoAP protocol stack, message and header format
If forwarding queue is full and new data arrives, the oldest
packet is discarded while the virtual queue is incremented.
On the other end, if the data queue is found to be empty, a
null packet is forwarded and the virtual queue is decremented.
This ensures scalability with a large number of nodes.
F. CTP (Collection Tree Protocol)
CTP [36] is a simple tree-based routing protocol designed
for relatively low traffic rates providing many-to-one or one-
to-many communication. CTP is a best-effort protocol that
does not guarantee 100% reliable delivery. Also, it is address-
free and the routes to tree roots are generated by using the
expected transmissions (ETX). A single root is allowed which
has ETX of 0, while a node’s ETX is a sum of the ETX of
its parent and the ETX of its link to the parent. If several
routes are valid, the route with minimum ETX will be chosen
for transmission. Routes are not updated periodically, only
when inconsistency in the topology is detected [37]. A loop
may occur if node chooses a route with significantly higher
gradient value compared to the previous value. This problem
is addressed through the broadcast of a beacon frame so that
node which sent the data can adjust its routes. Optionally, the
routes with ETX higher than the predefined threshold value
can be taken out of consideration [36]. The protocol provides
a mechanism for avoiding the packet duplication.
G. CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol)
CoAP [38] supports application-layer communication and it
has been developed for web transfer within the IoT. Similarly
to the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), CoAP depends on
the representational state transfer (REST) architecture which is
embedded in User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for transactions
in the 6LoWPAN environments. Opposite to HTTP, which
is relatively expensive both in the implementation and code
space, CoAP uses very limited resources and with reduced
complexity provides the same set of services [38]. The CoAP
architecture is split into two layers, message layer and request
response layer, which are shown in Fig. 5. The CoAP message
starts with a 4-byte fixed header which consists of the version
field (V), the message type field (T), the token length field
(TKL), the code field and the Message ID. The messages are
exchanged asynchronously between two endpoints which is
provided through a lightweight reliability mechanism which
supports different types of messages: confirmable (CON), non-
confirmable (NON), acknowledgement (ACK) and reset (RST)
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IEEE 802.15.4 SECURITY SUITES
Security Suite Name Access
Control
Data
Encryp.
Frame
Integ.
Sequen.
Fresh.
None
AES-CTR X X X
AES-CBC-MAC-128 X X
AES-CBC-MAC-64 X X
AES-CBC-MAC-32 X X
AES-CCM-128 X X X X
AES-CCM-64 X X X X
AES-CCM-32 X X X X
[13]. The request response layer deals with the arrival of
messages that are out of order, lost or duplicated.
IV. ATTACKS & SECURITY MECHANISMS FOR PHY AND
MAC LAYER COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
A. Security & Attacks in IEEE 802.15.4
The security mechanism for IEEE 802.15.4 is implemented
only in the MAC layer with the choice of operating in either
secured or non-secured mode. The secured mode satisfies four
security requirements: access control, data encryption, frame
integrity, and sequential freshness [39] which are supported
through various security suites. The security suites are us-
ing the symmetric cryptography and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [13] and they can work in different modes
of operation: the counter mode (CTR), the cipher block
chaining with message authentication mode (CBC-MAC), or
the authenticate-and-encrypt block cipher mode (CCM). Most
of them support the message integrity codes (MIC) of a
different length (32, 64 or 128 bits) [39]. Table II indicates
the security services supported by each suite. The standard
does not specify how the keys should be managed or what
kind of authentication policies should be used, so this should
be addressed by the upper layers of the protocol stack.
Despite the possibility of having secure modes, due to
the operating rules and a limited number of communication
channels, the standard is susceptible to several basic attacks.
These are mainly based on jamming techniques which can lead
to more serious DoS and man in the middle attack. The work
in [40] showed that the additional security towards sweep and
reactive jamming could be provided by the IEEE 802.15.4.e
amendment with channel hopping. Also, authors proposed data
encryption to prevent data denial. If an attacker corrupts PHR,
the time of FCS can be predicted so that the frame is jammed.
However, as the encryption covers only MAC payload, an
adversary might be able to read the 802.15.4 MAC header
and decide on taking an action which can seriously affect
the network. For example, if an adversary changes the frame
counter or injects false data, that frame will be finally rejected,
but it will waste some energy [40]. An additional threat to
IEEE 802.25.4 comes from the fact that there is no integrity
protection provided on ACK frames, so the eavesdropper can
forge the ACK frame and fool the sender of the successful
reception of the frame. This could be addressed by using a
form of authentication; however the overhead and delays in
the network would increase [39].
B. Security & Attacks in B-MAC
To this end, no security mechanism has been defined in
the context of B-MAC protocol. B-MAC, but also the other
protocols on MAC layer, are vulnerable mostly to jamming
and collisions while operating. Due to the use of adaptive
thresholding, B-MAC provides some level of immunity against
certain type of constant jammers. In the case of the static
jammer transmitting at a constant power, and the static node,
it is less probable that a jammer will not be detected. The
periodical jamming is also not considered as a serious threat
to B-MAC, as the protocol uses a periodic cycle only for
listening, and not sending. If an attacker wants to perform
a jamming attack on B-MAC that uses periodic listening
cycles, a preamble interval has to be determined. This is
known as a statistical jamming attack based on the probability
estimation of packet inter-arrival times [30]. If an adversary
chooses to guess, more frequent sampling is needed which
reduces the efficiency of jammer. In [41], authors modeled
several denial-of-sleep attacks that can severely disrupt the
service by knowing a protocol. An additional threat would be
if an attacker penetrates link-layer encryption; the network’s
lifetime could reduce from several months to only few days.
C. Summary
In the context of the IEEE 802.15.4 PHY protocol, ex-
isting AES/CCM hardware encryption provides an efficient
cryptographic basis which can be reused by the upper layers.
However, the keying model should be precisely defined to
avoid the danger of different entities using the same key.
Additionally, the fact that header and ACK frames are not
encrypted could be exploited to perform simple attacks that
could lead to an increase in energy consumption or more
seriously to DoS. When it comes to the MAC layer protocols,
more sophisticated jammers can be considered as a major treat
as there is no adequate protection. Table III summarizes all
attacks against the IEEE 802.15.4 and B-MAC protocols and
countermeasures that exist in the literature. We also comment
on the main advantages/disadvantages of the proposed security
mechanisms and their type.
V. ATTACKS & SECURITY MECHANISMS FOR ADAPTATION
AND NETWORK LAYER COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
A. Security & Attacks in 6LoWPAN
No security mechanism has been adopted in the context of
6LoWPAN protocol. The threats to 6LoWPAN are emerging
from 802.15.4 and IP networks, but the most severe ones are
the consequence of the attacks on the network layer which is
usually represented by RPL. The main security threat arising
from the adaptation layer itself is a fragmentation attack
where changing the packet fragmentation fields could lead
to a replay attack that causes the overflowing at receiver
side or complete denial of service. This is due to the lack
of node authentication when joining the network. In [42],
authors proposed new packet format where Timestamp and
Nonce options are added to the fragmented packets to guar-
antee packet freshness. Two additional security schemes to
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SUMMARY OF ATTACKS AGAINST IEEE 802.15.4 AND B-MAC AND EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES
Protocol Relevant Attack Proposed Countermeasure Type Comments
IEEE 802.15.4 Sweep and reactive
jamming
IEEE 802.15.4e amendment [40] PS Adds secured ACKs and channel hopping; However, it does not
ensure defence under wide-band jamming;
Eavesdropping and
forging ACK frame
MIC (Message Integrity Code) [39] PS The form of authentication through MIC is supported by built-in
AES-CBC-MAC suits; It increases the overhead, and the delay
of transmitting a frame;
Denying data through
MAC and PHY header
Encrypting the data payload [40] PS It covers only the MAC payload, not headers; By corrupting FCS
only, data can be denied or it can lead to waste in energy;
B-MAC Statistical jamming Shortening the preamble size [30] PS Shortening the preamble (that B-MAC relies on) too much
defeats its purpose;
Denial of sleep attack Link-layer authentic., anti-replay
protection, jamm. identif. & mitiga-
tion, broadcast attack defense [41]
PS There is no energy efficient attack against B-MAC which means
that the attacker is awake most of the time. However, this
framework has not been simulated/tested;
prevent fragmentation attacks were proposed in [43]. In the
content chaining scheme receiving node uses cryptographic
mechanisms to verify that received fragments belong to the
same packet, while the split buffer approach promotes direct
competition between legitimate nodes and an attacker in using
deficient buffer resources. The authentication can be ensured
by employing network access control framework described in
[44].
The 6LoWPAN does not ensure end-to-end protection be-
tween an IP sensor node and the Internet which makes it
vulnerable to eavesdropping/spoofing and man in the middle
attacks. These can be prevented by IPsec which defines a set of
protocols to enable the authentication and encryption of each
IP packet at the network layer [45]. The most common attack
in the category of threats arising from the Internet is the botnet
attack where data is forged by the botnet network and the
wrong data is sent to the user node. In [46], authors proposed
an additional module in 6LoWPAN gateway that analyses data
passing though the gateway searching for malicious traffic. The
security treats to the 6LoWPAN arising from the RPL routing
protocol will be discussed next.
B. Security & Attacks in RPL
RPL protocol was designed to support confidentiality, in-
tegrity, availability, and non-repudiation [47]. The current
specification defines three basic security modes [13]:
1) Unsecured mode - The default mode where no security
mechanism is applied to routing, but it supports a link-
layer security or other mechanisms used by the network.
2) Preinstalled mode - Supports confidentiality, integrity
and data authentication based on the use of secure
messages and a preconfigured symmetric key. A node
may join the RPL network either as a host or as a router.
3) Authenticated mode - Nodes which have a preconfigured
symmetric key can join the network as hosts only. The
routers have to obtain a second key from a key authority
which ensures the authentication and the authorization
and provides per hop message security between two
neighboring nodes.
Despite the specification, none of the RPL security modes
have been implemented yet. This makes the RPL prone to
the most of internal network layer attacks In Table IV which
could severely impact the data routing. However, there is a
decent amount of literature on the security mechanisms against
internal attacks which are given next.
In [48], authors proposed a lightweight heartbeat protocol
to detect faults within the RPL-based network. It was shown
that if combined with IPsec [49], the heartbeat protocol can
be used to detect selective forwarding attack. In [50], an
intrusion detection system has been used to detect spoofed
or altered information, sinkhole, and selective forwarding.
Selective forwarding attack has been also addressed by using
resilient techniques, such as random routes and data replication
[51], while the mechanisms for detecting sinkholes were given
in [50], [52], and [53]. Hello flood attack cannot exist for
a long time within the RPL network due to the self-healing
mechanism. However, if combined with some other internal
attack the adequate protection will be needed [20]. Wormhole
attack can be prevented by using a Merkel tree authentication
[54] or separate link-layer keys for different segments of the
network [48]. Additionally, in [55] the authors proposed a
graph theoretic approach. Sybil attack and clone ID are usually
prevented by keeping the track of the number of instances of
each identity and by using the geographical location of nodes
[48], [56].
The additional attacks on the RPL might arise from its
operating rules in optimizing network performance. Examples
are DAG/DAO inconsistency attack and rank attack. In the
DAG/DAO inconsistency attack an adversary modifies the
flags used to detect inconsistencies in the network. As a result
the targeted node will discard the packet and reset the trickle
timer; hence, the control messages will be sent more frequently
which will waste energy and increase delay. In [57], authors
proposed to limit the rate of tickle timer resets to 20, while in
[58] and [59] two methods, adaptive threshold and dynamic
approach, were used. On the other side, in the case of rank
attack an adversary can attract the large traffic by advertising
false rank value, so non-optimal routes might be established.
Solutions to address this problem are given in [60] and [61].
C. Security & Attacks in BCP
As it is primarily academic routing protocol, no security
mechanism has been adopted for BCP. The main threat comes
from internal attacks where for example, a malicious node can
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SUMMARY OF ATTACKS AGAINST 6LOWPAN, RPL, BCP, AND CTP AND EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES
Protocol Relevant Attack Proposed Countermeasure Type Comments
6LoWPAN Fragmentation attack Timestamp for undirectional and Nonce
for bidirectional fragmented packets [42]
PS Fragmented packet formats have to be redefined; The
framework has not been simulated/tested;
The content chaining scheme and the split
buffer approach [43]
PS The attack is mitigated at moderate memory & com-
putational cost with the increased overhead.
Authentication attack Network access control framework [44] PS Provides the node identification, but only enables one
border router; Not implemented yet;
Man in the middle, Eaves-
dropping/spoofing
IPsec (AH and EPS) [45] PS Provides end-to-end secure communication; Pre-shared
keys mechanism is not very flexible;
Botnet attack Bot analysis module [46] IDS Good detection rates for large number of nodes; De-
creased network performance and large overhead;
RPL Selective forwarding attack Lightweight Heartbeat [48] IDS It has to be combined with IPsec to detect attack; No
defense is provided after the attack is detected;
Resilient techniques [51] PS Improved delivery ratio, but an increase in energy
consumption;
Spoofed/altered inf., sink-
hole, selective forwarding
SVELTE [50] IDS SVELTEs overhead is small enough; The true positive
rate is not 100% due to some false alarms;
Sinkhole attack IDS solution [52] IDS IPsec and bidirectional communication are necessary.
Parent fail-over & rank authentication
[53]
PS Combination of both techniques is more effective;
Dense networks can combat penetration of sinkholes;
Wormhole attack Separate keys for network segments [48] PS The solution was not implemented/simulated yet;
Merkel trees authentication [54] PS Node uses a key to encrypt its messages; High jitter
and E2E delay until tree has been established;
Graph theoretic approach [55] PS Cryptographic techniques based on local broadcast
keys; Low overhead, no synchronization needed;
Sybil attack, Clone ID Distributed hash tables (DHT) to store the
graphical location of nodes [48], [56]
PS Problem in how to securely verify the node location;
Might not scale well with large networks;
DAG/DAO inconsistency at-
tack
Limit the rate of tickle timer resets [57] PS Threshold value is fixed, no network or node charac-
teristics are taken into account;
Adaptive threshold [58] PS Takes into account the network characteristics;
Dynamic approach [59] PS Improved version as node specific parameters are used;
Rank attack VeRa [60] PS Authentication mechanism based on hash operations;
Low time overhead, but still vulnerable to rank attacks
by forgery and replay;
TRAIL [61] PS Improvement of VeRa, requires almost no cryptogra-
phy, but shows dependency on network sizes;
BCP Blackhole attack, header/data
modif., false routes/queue
info.
VAR trust model [35] IDS Performance is verified in TinyOS over a 25-node
sensor network test-bed; Increased overhead;
Blackhole, sel. forwarding,
on-off and multiple attacks
Virtual trust queuing [62] RS The solution sustains the throughput performance under
attack; Problems with detecting low rate attacks;
CTP Sinkhole attack which can
lead to other internal attacks
Intrusion detection system based on link
quality [63]
IDS Low rates of false positive, but increased energy con-
sumption; Suitable for large-scale networks;
N/A Secure CTP protocol [37] PS Provides authentication, integrity and freshness; No
implementation with an adversary was provided.
Data loss, data alteration,
sinkhole and selective for-
warding
Kinesis [64] RS Automated response system to both, attacks and
anomalies; The hidden node problem and partitioning
of the neighborhood introduce redundant actions.
choose to selectively forward data or drop all received packets.
In both scenarios the network operation would be disturbed.
Also, by modifying the message header or data itself, the
integrity within the network would be affected. Additional
threats may arise from BCP operating rules. A malicious node
can advertise the false queue size and link quality to either
attract or repel any incoming traffic. Also, a node may ignore
the information advertised by its neighbors and decide to send
packets to highly congested areas.
In [35], the authors presented a trust model for WSNs that
work with dynamic backpressure routing. They introduced
different trust metrics to monitor the successful forwarding
of data packets, as well as the queue size advertisements.
The model was implemented in TinyOS in the presence of
no forwarding nodes, in the case of header/data modification
attacks, misleading routes and false queue information. In
[62], authors proposed a virtual trust queuing scheme whereby
jointly stabilizing the virtual trust queue and the real packet
queue, BCP achieves guarantees of attack resilience as well
as throughput performance.
D. Security & Attacks in CTP
CTP does not provide any security measures as it was
designed to ensure minimum power consumption. The routes
are chosen spontaneously based on the link quality; hence, it
can not resist any intrusion. In [63], authors identified the
sinkhole attack as a major treat to CTP routing that can
initiate other attacks, such as selective forwarding, black holes,
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data tampering, etc. They proposed the sinkhole detection
approach based on link quality which is characterized by a
low rate of false positives and a low energy consumption.
Additionally, by changing the CTP operating rules a number
of attacks can be launched. For example, a node can advertise
false value of ETX which could lead to the presence of
loops and inconsistencies within the network. This would
increase the number of beacon frames sent in order to adjust
the routes, as well as the energy consumption. In [37] the
secure version of CPT is given which fulfills the essential
security requirements: authentication, integrity and freshness.
It is shown that adding security does not necessarily mean
an increase in power consumption; however, the network
performance was not simulated in the presence of an adversary.
In [64], the authors presented Kinesis, an automated response
system to both attacks and anomalies. Upon being notified of
an incident via the detection scheme, the system matches the
appropriate response policy to specify the action.
E. Summary
It can be concluded that network layer protocols are more
prone to internal than external attacks. Having a malicious
node in the network has to be considered as a serious threat and
adequate techniques to detect and mitigate the attack have to
be identified. Table IV summarizes all threats against selected
network layer communication protocols. We also give the
existing countermeasures proposed in the literature describing
their main characteristics and the type. The analysis shows
that detecting the intrusion only does not give any guarantees
of protecting the network at run-time and that more automated
solutions are needed.
VI. ATTACKS & SECURITY MECHANISMS FOR COAP
APPLICATION LAYER COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
The initial version of CoAP had no security features.
However, the research community proposed DTLS (Datagram
Transport Layer Security) protocol [65] to secure CoAP mes-
sages and deal with the unreliable nature of UDP communi-
cation. The DTLS guarantees confidentiality, authentication,
integrity and non-repudiation. It can support four security
modes:
• NoSEc - DTLS is not used.
• PreSharedKey - DTLS is used and a list of predistributed
symmetric keys is provided. Nodes which share the same
key are authenticated as a part of the group.
• RawPublicKey - DTLS is used and the nodes are provided
with a pair of asymmetric keys which are installed on a
node in the manufacturing phase.
• Certificate - It’s an extension of the RawPublicKey mode
where certificate is provided by a certification authority.
A list of trusted anchors which can be used to verify the
certificates is given to the nodes.
The DTLS consists of two layers. The bottom layer provides
a symmetric key encryption, while at the upper layer the
’handshake’ process establishes a session key and sets the
security settings, so that the data can be carried inside a
ciphered message. The main drawback of DTLS is that it does
not support multicast communications, which will be required
in many IoT environments. The handshake phase is considered
as challenging due to its complexity and large number of
messages exchanged. If there is a breach in the security within
the handshake process it could lead to an exhaustion attack.
Also, the handshake messages are too large which causes the
fragmentation at 6LoWPAN adaptation layer, so the cost of
their computation at the end of handshake process is high
[13]. The DLTS provides protection against a replay attack, but
even if dropped in the end, packets still need to be processed
which increases the energy consumption. It also assumes a
large buffer to store all messages which is not applicable to
constrained networks. Additionally, while CoAP inquires 2
transactions per transmission, if DTLS is used 4 transactions
are needed. All of this implies that an adequate trade-off
between security and a lightweight implementation of DTLS
has to be provided. In [66], two compression schemes for
DLTS were proposed to provide compression of handshake
and application data messages which is around 36% of the
header length. In [67], a lightweight solution was presented
which reduces the number of requests to perform the session
and is robust to replay attack, DoS and chosen cipher text.
To summarize, there is a broad range of areas where the
DTLS as the CoAP’s security mechanism is still lacking.
When it comes to its deployment with the constrained devices
in IoT the trade-off between security and the overhead has to
be taken into account as well as the multicast nature of the
IoT environments.
VII. SECURITY ATTACKS EVALUATION IN COOJA
Owing to their operating nature, WSN are typically prone
to the wide range of attacks discussed in Section II-B. The
fact that nodes are deployed in accessible environments raises
the danger of their physical capture. Additionally, new ma-
licious node can join the network freely if no authentication
technique has been implemented. Understanding the impact
and consequences of an attack to the network’s performance
helps to prevent possible denial of service. Therefore, fast
and accurate simulations of WSNs in the presence of an
adversary are of the great value in designing resilient, but also
secure sensor networks. In [68], authors surveyed most popular
network simulators. What is common for all of them is that
they lack an unified security module. Rather than proposing
a new simulation tool to address security needs, we wish to
exploit the features of Contiki’s network simulator/emulator
Cooja [69]. As Cooja is very popular within the WSN research
community, our aim is to examine the possibility of using it
as a benchmark for quantifying the impact of attacks and for
developing new countermeasures. As an example of how this
can be used we analyze the effect that internal attacks have
on the performance of RPL-based networks.
Network and threat model. We consider a WSN that has
N = S ∪ R devices communicating in a multi-hop fashion.
S is the set of all sensor nodes that generate and send data
packets, while R is the set of all roots that collect data packets
from the network. We define Nx(t) ⊆ N to be the set of one-
hop neighbors that node x ∈ N can communicate with during
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Fig. 6. Simulation environment
time slot t, where t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , tf}, tf < ∞. The network
is modeled as time-variant weighted graph G(N ,L) where
L consists of all possible wireless links for the node pairs
x, y ∈ N . The entry (x, y) ∈ L represents the communication
link between the source node x and the destination node
y. Assuming the standard layered infrastructure of WSNs,
we address the attacks specific to the network layer which
are: blackhole, hello flood, replay attack, selective forwarding,
sinkhole and sybil attack. Also, we consider the effect of
having multiple attackers in the network.
Implementation of attacks. At time t each malicious node
xm ∈ N is able to perform one of the attacks given below:
1) Blackhole attack where the node xm fails to forward
any data packets received from its one-hop neighbors
y ∈ Nxm(t).
2) Hello flood attack where the node xm broadcasts a hello
packet every 20ms in order to cause collisions and jam
its one-hope neighborhood.
3) Replay attack where the node xm overhears the traffic
of its one-hop neighbors y ∈ Nxm(t). Any packets
overheard during the neighbors’ transmissions are then
replayed.
4) Selective forwarding attack where the node xm fails to
forward data packets received from two of his neighbors.
The set of affected neighbors changes every 60s.
5) Sinkhole attack where the node xm advertises falsely
that it’s a sink (i.e. Rankxm(t) = 1).
6) Sybil attack where the node xm replicates identity of
one of its neighbors y ∈ Nxm(t). By having the same
ID any data packets sent to y will be also passed to xm.
Evaluation of the attacks. This stage evaluates the impact
of each attack on the network performance. Two types of ex-
periments have been performed on a random network topology
using the Cooja network simulator. The network topology is
depicted in Fig. 6, while the simulation parameters are given
in Table V. First scenario is free from any malicious activity
and will be used as a benchmark for evaluating the effects
of the attacks. The second scenario replicates the malicious
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Simulator Cooja under Contiki 3.0 OS
Radio environment Unit disk graph medium (UDGM): dist. loss
Deployment area 400m × 400m
Type & no. of nodes Cooja mote, 100 senders & 1 sink
Range of nodes Trans. range: 50m, Interference range: 50m
Physical layer IEEE 802.15.4
MAC layer ContikiMAC, IPv6
Network Layer ContikiRPL
Transport Layer UDP
Simulation duration 4h
Sending rate 1 packet in every 10 sec
activity, where a malicious node can perform one of the six
attacks defined previously. Additionally, we consider the effect
of having more than one malicious node in the network. The
position of malicious node has been chosen such that the
impact to the network performance is ensured (e.g. as leaf
nodes are not doing any forwarding tasks and cannot cause
the data loss, they are taken out from the consideration).
To gain an insight concerning the performance of RPL in
the presence of a malicious node we use the following metrics:
1) Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) - PDR represents the
ratio between the total number of packets successfully
received by the sink and the number of packets sent by
the nodes.
2) End-to-End (E2E) Delay - E2E delay represents the
average time needed for a packet to travel between the
source and the destination (sink).
The objective of these simulations is to show how the Cooja
simulation tool can estimate the attack impact (in terms of
previous metrics) on the network. The results are depicted in
Fig. 7. As it can be observed, the attacks can be grouped into
three categories as follows: 1) attacks that reduce both, PDR
and E2E delay, as the malicious nodes drop data which allows
faster delivery of unaffected packets in the network (selective
forwarding, blackhole, sinkhole), 2) attacks that reduce PDR,
but increase E2E delay due to an increase in the total number
of packets in the network (replay attack, hello flood attack)
and 3) attacks that do not affect any of the metrics drastically
(sybil attack) as some additional metrics might be needed (e.g
per node/per packet E2E delay).
Recommendations for using Cooja in designing coun-
termeasures. In this section, we showed that WSN attacks
can severely disrupt normal network operation. By extending
the features of Cooja we were able to measure and quantify
this disruption in a convenient way. The understanding of
the impact and behavior will be necessary when protecting
the network. Here, in the simulation scenarios, we explored
two different metrics. However, there are many others to be
tested. For example, if there was a new countermeasure to be
implemented its energy overhead could be easily identified
through the Powertrace tool in Cooja [70], as well as its
resilience towards built-in attacks. This will allow us to test the
countermeasure before actual deployment. Therefore, it would
be of great interest to the research community to have access
to a security module within the Cooja, such as one developed
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Fig. 7. PDR and E2E delay of the network in the presence of a malicious node/malicious nodes performing different network layer attacks
here, which replicates the most common and most destructive
attacks on the WSNs. This would serve as a benchmark
to develop and test new security mechanisms which would
contribute to faster developments in this research area.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this survey we perform an exhaustive analysis on the
security of widely deployed communication protocols and
standards in WSNs. We show that most of the security solu-
tions in the area are still at a proof-of-concept level and there is
a trade-off between the level of security required for a specific
application and the overhead in the security mechanism. Also,
there is a tendency towards solutions that can detect the
intrusion, but also provide an automated response to ensure
network’s normal operation. Additionally, we give a small-
scale example of our security module in Cooja that allows the
evaluation of the network’s performance in the presence of
malicious activity. We believe that this is a step closer to using
Cooja as a benchmark for developing new security defenses
for the most popular communication protocols.
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